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# A Political Economy of Historical Change and Continuity in Turkish Foreign Policy

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## ABSTRACT

This study aims to analyse historical continuity and change in Turkish foreign policy (TFP) within the framework of Critical Theory as elucidated by Robert Cox. It suggests asking how TFP has been affected by the historical changes in relations of production and world orders. Within this framework, it aims to explain the changes in TFP within the relation between the production, the world order and the form of state. It analyses TFP in three historical periods such as the Interwar Years, Cold War and post-Cold War. It exposes that Turkish state (re)formation and foreign policy making has succumbed to the global capitalist relations of production and corresponding world orders. These two have been the major framework(s) of change and continuity in Türkiye's 100 years-old foreign policy. Its main argument is that the continuity and change in TFP has shown an interplay of relations between production and world order. It concludes that TFP has been in line with the global relations of production so there has been a clear and substantial continuity; and that the arguable changes have been the repercussions of global relations of production and world orders.

**Keywords:** Turkish foreign policy, relations of production, Critical Theory, Cox, world order

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## Introduction

This study discusses the historical change and continuity in Turkish foreign policy (TFP) within a political economic framework. It aims at historical contextualisation of TFP within global relations of production. The main question is how TFP has been affected by the historical changes of world order and of relations of production within the framework of the Critical Theory as elucidated by Robert Cox. Analyses of foreign policy within Critical Theory has not been observed much. This can perhaps be because the field of foreign policy was thought to be within the confines of what Cox called “Problem-solving Theory” instead of Critical Theory that has focused on (potential for) historical change in world order; as is also implied in one of his late interviews.<sup>1</sup>

1 Cox said “Critical theory thus historicizes world orders by uncovering the purposes problem solving theories within such an order serve to uphold. By uncovering the contingency of an existing world order, one can then proceed to think about different world orders. It is more marginal than problem solving theory since it does not comfortably provide

This article is an attempt to contribute to the literature by using the Coxian Critical Theory in foreign policy analysis. In this manner, it is also an attempt to relate TFP to political economic history. Such an attempt to understand TFP and global relations of production has rarely been observed<sup>2</sup> and hence this article aims at contributing to this critical understanding. The implication of this study is to understand and discuss the changes in TFP within global relations of production, in addition to other frameworks that have been widely studied. Cox has indeed been known further interest in historical changes.<sup>3</sup> Coxian Critical Theory has been found plausible because it is flexible, change-oriented and reflective.<sup>4</sup> In this article, an empirical narrative on the historical changes of TFP will be contextualised in relations of production.

Interwar years, the Cold War and the post-Cold War eras are depicted as the periods of historical change following mainstream international political conceptions. One may argue fairly that post-Cold War era is over, though one cannot necessarily clarify what the new era exactly is. Notwithstanding the merits of the discussions on considering the 9/11 attacks or 2008 global economic crisis as the introduction of new eras, this article assumes that the world is still in the post-Cold War period. Some may argue from a political economic standpoint that a new era (of crisis and disorder) started with 2008 Global Crisis in which the world is still struggling. However convincing this standpoint is, this approach would tend to periodise plausibly on the basis of 1929, 1973 and 2008 crises. This article prefers the international political periodisation because of its main focus on foreign policy. In this manner, the periodisation will not consider the transformation from Keynesianism to Neo-liberalism although the substance of this colossal change and its impact in TFP will certainly be under scrutiny. Following this introduction, a brief section on Cox and foreign policy will be presented and after which TFP will be analysed within the three periods in question, and finally a conclusion will sum up the main arguments.

## Robert Cox And Foreign Policy

Robert Cox considered production in the broadest sense, as a “universal human activity that conditions all other human activities<sup>5</sup> including “the production and reproduction of knowledge and of the social relations, morals, and institutions that are prerequisites to the production of

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policy recommendations to those in power.” in “Robert Cox on World Orders, Historical Change, and the Purpose of Theory in International Relations”, *Theory Talk #37: Robert Cox*, <http://www.theory-talks.org/2010/03/theory-talk-37.html> (Accessed 23 November 2023).

- 2 Some examples that could be found are the followings: Faruk Yalvaç, “Approaches to Turkish Foreign Policy: A Critical Realist Analysis”, *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 15, No 1, 2014, p. 377-402; Faruk Yalvaç, “Strategic Depth or Hegemonic Depth? A Critical Realist Analysis of Turkey’s Position in the World System”, *International Relations*, Vol. 26, No 2, 2012, p. 165-180; Furkan Kaya, Mesut Özcan and Soner Doğan, “Eleştirel Gerçeklik ve ‘Dünya Beşten Büyüktür Söylemi’ Bağlamında Türkiye’nin Küresel Düzen Talebi”, *Gaziantep University Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 21, No 4, 2022, p. 2408-2425.
- 3 Shannon K. Brincat, “From International Relations to World Civilizations: The Contributions of Robert W. Cox”, *Globalizations*, Vol. 13, No 5, 2016, p. 506.
- 4 Anthony Leysens, “Critical Theory and the Southern African Region: A Framework for Discovery?”, *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, Vol. 18, No 2, 2000, p. 265.
- 5 Robert W. Cox, *Production, Power and World Order, Social Forces in the Making of History*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1987, p. 397.

physical goods”.<sup>6</sup> The form of the state is important because it presides “over the accumulation process, whether capitalist or redistributive, and it is ultimately the state that determines the particular clustering of modes of social relations of production”.<sup>7</sup> In this sense, states create the conditions for the dominance of particular modes of social relations.<sup>8</sup> Cox claimed that the form of state came into existence through a historical process of conflict and realignment of social groups. For instance, the liberal change in TFP in 2000s has been discussed exactly within this framework of realignments in and on the Turkish state.<sup>9</sup>

Furthermore, Cox outlined different historical forms of state and elucidated the correspondence between the production and the form of state in the examples of the self-regulating market and liberal state, the tripartite corporatism and welfare-nationalist state, the state corporatism and fascist state, the central planning and Bolshevik state.<sup>10</sup> World order has been defined through the nature and incidence of wars, the manner of resolving disputes, and the creation and distribution of wealth and poverty. World orders are shaped by relations of production and by forms of state, and stabilized structures of world order in turn provide a framework conducive to certain production and form of state.<sup>11</sup> This article aims at explaining the changes in TFP within this theoretical framework of the relation between the production, the world order and the state.

Cox himself has not made much reference to the analysis of foreign policy in one of his last substantial interviews, except American foreign policy. He suggested focusing on “the material conditions of existence, the prevailing ideas, and the existing institutions to see how they interrelate.”<sup>12</sup> The field of Foreign Policy Analysis has generally been perceived as one that is mostly related to implementation.<sup>13</sup> The word ‘foreign policy’ can hardly be found in Coxian studies. Cox’s works has been used in International Political Economy and Theories of International Relations rather than Foreign Policy Analysis. Discussions on the place of Cox

6 Robert W. Cox, “Production, the State and Change in World Order”, James Rosenau, Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds.), *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges*, Massachusetts and Toronto, Lexington Books, 1989, p. 39.

7 Ibid., p. 40.

8 Cox, *Production, Power and World Order*, p. 399.

9 Kemal Kirişçi, “The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State”, *New Perspectives on Turkey*, No 40, 2009, p. 29-57; Mustafa Türkeş, “Decomposing Neo-Ottoman Hegemony”, *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, Vol. 18, No 3, 2016, p. 91-216.

10 Cox, “Production, the State and Change in World Order”, p. 41.

11 Ibid., p. 7.

12 Daniel Drache and José Luis Valdés-Ugalde, “The International System: Hinge Moments and Structural Long-Term Trends. A Canadian Perspective: Interview with Robert W. Cox”, *Norteamérica*, Vol. 4, No 2, 2009.

13 This discussion can be elaborately found in the followings, among many others: Chris Alden and Amnon Aran, *Foreign Policy Analysis New Approaches*, Londra, Routledge, 2017; Toygar Halistoprak, “Türkiye’de Dış Politika Analizi Çalışmaları”, Ayça Ergun, Çiğdem Üstün, Sinem Akgül Açıkmeşe (eds.), *Türkiye’de Uluslararası İlişkiler Çalışmaları*, Ankara, İmge, 2023, p. 85; Seçkin Barış Gülmez ve Didem Buhari Gülmez, “Dış Politika Analizi: Teorik Yaklaşımlar”, Bezen Balamir Coşkun ve İnan Rüma (eds.), *Dış Politika Analizi, Konu, Kuram, Yöntem*, İstanbul, Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2020, p. 13-40; Emre Erdoğan, “Sonsuz Olasılıklar Diyarında: Dış Politika Analizi ve Araştırma Yöntemi Tercihleri”, Bezen Balamir Coşkun ve İnan Rüma (eds.), *Dış Politika Analizi, Konu, Kuram, Yöntem*, İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2020, p. 41-76; Fulya Hisarlıoğlu, “Eylem, Söylem ve Dış Politika: Toplumsalın Bir Parçası Olarak Dış Politikayı Yeniden Tartışmak”, Bezen Balamir Coşkun ve İnan Rüma (eds.), *Dış Politika Analizi, Konu, Kuram, Yöntem*, İstanbul, Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2020, p. 97-120; Bezen Balamir Coşkun, “Dış Politika Analizinde Bir Yöntem Olarak Süreç İzleme”, Bezen Balamir Coşkun ve İnan Rüma (eds.), *Dış Politika Analizi, Konu, Kuram, Yöntem*, İstanbul, Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2020, p.77-96.

in International Relations are various and plenty to the extent that his famous sentence “theory is always for someone and for some purpose” is said to be “the most quoted line in IR”.<sup>14</sup> This has repercussions also in Turkish studies of international relations.<sup>15</sup> A major work on Cox in International Political Economy<sup>16</sup> among many others has exposed an important overview and discussion.<sup>17</sup> There has been direct criticisms as well such as Cemgil who has evaluated Cox from a Marxist perspective and argued that his theoretical work could not fulfill its potential due to Weberian influences.<sup>18</sup> Coxian analyses or concepts have been adapted to different topics: the political economic role of the state has been examined in the example of South Asia;<sup>19</sup> the transformative role of social forces has been discussed in the case of Southern Africa;<sup>20</sup> “state-society complex” has been studied in Africa;<sup>21</sup> social forces and poverty have been analysed in the framework of global governance.<sup>22</sup>

Some few attempts at foreign policy analysis have also been observed. Clegg attempted to analyse United States of America (US) and China within “Cox’s critical view of multilateralism as a ‘terrain of struggle’ between a conservative developed North and a transformative developing South”.<sup>23</sup> In yet another, Haukkala analysed the role of academics in the making of foreign policy within the framework of Cox’s distinction of problem-solving theory and Critical Theory.<sup>24</sup> These works have not been an analysis of a foreign policy within the particular framework of the relation between production, world order and the form of state.

Contemporary studies in TFP have witnessed direct references to the relations of production, no matter what name and frame they give it. There have already been underemphasised yet very important -critical- studies on the political economy of TFP such as Gerger who has approached it within the framework of criticisms of (American) imperialism and Uzgel who has contemplated on the social class aspects of the “national interest”.<sup>25</sup> In a similar critical understanding, Yalvaç has analysed the contemporary governments of Justice and Development Party (JDP) within

14 Brincat, “From International Relations to World Civilizations”, p. 506.

15 Buğra Sarı, “An Analysis on Robert Cox’s Argument ‘Theory Is Always For Someone and For Some Purpose’: Its Implications and Significance In International Relations”, *Gazi Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, Vol. 16, No 3, 2014, p. 226-237.

16 This can be seen for example in the special issue on Cox in the journal *Globalizations*, Volume 13, Issue 5 (2016).

17 Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton, “The Deficits of Discourse in IPE: Turning Base Metal into Gold?”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 52, 2008, p. 103–128.

18 Cam Cemgil, “Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Uluslararası Siyasi İktisat Teorisinde Robert Cox ve Eleştirel Teori: Marx, Vico ve Tarihin Yapımı”, *Politik Ekonomik Kuram*, Vol. 5, No 2, 2021, p. 209-221.

19 Mustapha Kamal Pasha, “Liberalization, State Patronage, and the ‘New Inequality’ in South Asia”, *Journal of Developing Societies*, Vol. 16, No 1, 2000, p. 71-85.

20 Anthony J. Leysens, “Social Forces in Southern Africa: Transformation from Below?”, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 44, No 1, 2006, p. 31–58.

21 Paul D. Williams, *War and Conflict in Africa*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2011; book review by Rasul Ahmed Minja, *Political Studies Review*, Vol. 11, 2013, p. 147.

22 David Hulme, *Global Poverty: How Global Governance is Failing the Poor*, Abingdon, Routledge, 2010.

23 Jenny Clegg, “China at the Global Summit Table: Rule-taker, Deal-wrecker or Bridge-builder?”, *Contemporary Politics*, Vol. 17, No 4, 2011, p. 447–465

24 Hiski Haukkala, “Timing is Everything: The Time, Space, and Strategies for Scholarly Analysis in the Making of Foreign Policy”, *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol. 14, 2013, p. 221–233.

25 Haluk Gerger, *Türk Dış Politikasının Ekonomi Politigi*, İstanbul, Yordam Kitap, 2012; İlhan Uzgel, *Ulusal Çıkar ve Dış Politika*, Ankara, İmge Yayınevi, 2004.

a Critical Realist theoretical endeavour with the aim of posing an alternative to the dominant analyses from a Gramscian perspective on hegemony.<sup>26</sup> Despite the palpable merits of these critical studies, the cornerstone in the recent discussions has been the liberal standpoint on the transformation of TFP to one of a “trading state”.<sup>27</sup> In fact, this term “trading state” and corresponding elements such as the increase in foreign trade and its impact on emphasising cooperation and so on clearly signified a change in TFP as a result of relations of production.

In such a context, this article departs from the observation that Turkish state formation and foreign policy has succumbed to the global capitalist relations of production and corresponding world orders. It concludes that TFP has been in line with the relations of production so there has been clear and substantial continuity; and that the changes in question have rather been the repercussions of global relations of production. It should be noted that the article does not aim nor suggest a direct causality discussion; it rather aims at analysing the interplay of political economy and foreign policy through an empirical narrative of TFP.

## Foundations of TFP and Political Economy: The Interwar Period

The aftermath of the First World War was marked by Wilsonian Liberalism that aimed at global restoration of liberal capitalism. Within this framework, nation-states were to replace empires not only because they provided a more peaceful environment but also because they had been more convenient for industrial capitalist production.<sup>28</sup> Those nation-states have been supposed to provide economic viability and military security as well as national self-determination.<sup>29</sup> The period of heavy foreign investments in 19<sup>th</sup> century had manifested that the capitalist investors regarded the “orderly and debt-honouring governments in these countries as one of the rights of property” and tended to ask for help of their governments if these “rights” were challenged or disturbed by the political conditions in the corresponding country.<sup>30</sup> The restoration of global capitalist production after the First World War repeated this tendency through the economic viability of new nation-states. This has been the very world order into which Republic of Türkiye was proudly born.

Türkiye has been one of the most effective examples of these nation-states. Originally, it was explicitly stated as the twelfth in Wilson’s famous Fourteen Points, that “a secure sovereignty” for the Turkish part of the Ottoman Empire should be “assured” as well as the “security of life” and “autonomous development” for other nationalities, no doubt with an emphasis on straits and free trade “under international guarantees”.<sup>31</sup>

26 Yalvaç, “Strategic Depth or Hegemonic Depth?”, p. 165-180; Faruk Yalvaç, “A Historical Materialist Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy: Class, State, and Hegemony”, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Vol. 13, No 52, 2016; Yalvaç, “Approaches to Turkish Foreign Policy”, p. 377-402.

27 Kirişçi, “The transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy”, p. 33.

28 Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes, A History of the World 1914-1991*, New York, Vintage, 1994, p. 31.

29 David Thomson, *Europe Since Napoleon*, London, Penguin, 1990, p. 622, 573.

30 G.D.H. Cole, *Introduction to Economic History, 1750-1950*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 1952, p. 92.

31 *8 January, 1918: President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points*, The Avalon Project, Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, Yale Law School, Lillian Goldman Law Library, [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th\\_century/wilson14.asp](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp) (Accessed 21 January 2022).

The settlement was harder than stated. The Ankara government that led the resistance against the Allied occupation successfully rejected the partition. Allied powers withdrew and made peace with a “new, insurgent, efficient Turkey”. Then, “reduced to a hard territorial core, the compact new nationalist state of Turkey was free to carry out drastic internal reorganization”.<sup>32</sup> In this drastic reorganization, The Republic of Türkiye has been effective in demonstrating the famous dictum of E.H. Carr: “The nation became, more than ever before the supreme unit round which centre human demands for equality and human ambitions for predominance”.<sup>33</sup> This new understanding following Ottoman difficulty to accommodate to the new concept of nationhood and international relations was eventually met in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.<sup>34</sup>

The Treaty of Lausanne marked the foundation. It has been the “most successful and lasting peace settlement of the post-First World War period”<sup>35</sup> since it was not challenged in the Second World War and early post-Cold War era. The ability of the Turkish delegation’s balance of power policy to benefit from the disharmony between the allies has been one of the core points of the mainstream establishment of the TFP.<sup>36</sup> In the political economic aspect, the British delegation stressed the freedom of straits and at second place, Ottoman debt, capitulations and the future regime in Türkiye.<sup>37</sup> In fact, the message that Türkiye would remain in the (liberal) capitalist world order was given in February-March 1923 in the Izmir Economic Congress, meaningfully during the interruption of the Lausanne Conference.<sup>38</sup> The İzmir Congress has been widely regarded as the plausible symbol of Turkish acceptance of capitalist production and the corresponding world order.

The tragic Ottoman heritage heavily felt by the new Turkish élite signified “[economic] growth in dependency” though with relative political independence.<sup>39</sup> Countries such as the Ottoman Empire in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century were under the economic control of European capitalism through capital, technology and finance; although they could keep their formal independence and had not become colonies.<sup>40</sup> The Empire was integrated into global capitalism through commerce, indebtedment and direct investment.<sup>41</sup> Therefore, Ottoman legacy was being a peripheral country as a raw material exporter and industrial good importer, heavily indebted and under the control of major capitalist powers.<sup>42</sup> One could

32 Thomson, *Europe Since Napoleon*, p. 632.

33 E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939*, London, MacMillan, 1946, p. 227.

34 Boğaç Erozan, “Türkiye’de Uluslararası İlişkiler Disiplininin Uzak Tarihi: Hukuk-ı Düvel (1859-1945)”, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Vol. 11, No 43, 2014, p. 59, 66, 73.

35 Michael Dockrill, “Britain and Lausanne Conference 1922-23”, *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, Vol. 23, 1993, p. 1.

36 Mehmet Gönülöb, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1990*, Ankara, Siyasal Kitabevi, 1993, p.57.

37 DBFP Curzon to Sir R. Graham, Rome, tels 394 & 395, 14 November 1922, no. 193, pp. 273-274. Quoted in Dockrill, “Britain and Lausanne Conference 1922-23”, p. 3.

38 Baskın Oran, “İmparatorluk’tan Ulus-devlet’e Dış Politika: Benzerlikler ve Farklılıklar”, Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, p. 107.

39 Şevket Pamuk, *Osmanlı-Türkiye İktisadi Tarihi 1500-1914*, İstanbul, İletişim, 2005, p. 240-242.

40 Gülten Kazgan, *Tanzimat’tan 21. Yüzyıla Türkiye Ekonomisi*, İstanbul, Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2009, p. 7.

41 Çağlar Keyder, *Türkiye’de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, İstanbul, İletişim, 1989, 2010, p. 64.

42 Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908-2002*, Ankara, İmge, 2003, p. 19-20.

observe this in the railways: The Republic inherited 4,232km. whose 2,365 km. [%55] had been managed by foreign companies.<sup>43</sup>

The New Turkish republic's search for equal status, which was internationally confirmed in Lausanne, has also included an end to this economic control implying or implementing a heavy political influence. This was to be fulfilled with the integration to global capitalism as a new, independent, modern nation-state. The foreign policy would be formulated in the same line with references to a liberal world order. For instance, president Mustafa Kemal clearly expressed in March 1924, as the president of the just six months old Republic, that the foreign policy focus of the republic would be the maintenance of peace and the treaties as an independent and benevolent state.<sup>44</sup> Indeed, following the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty, Türkiye has become a pro-status quo state in terms of acceptance of existing borders, anti-irredentism and consolidation of existing balance.<sup>45</sup>

The search for economic independence to substantiate the equal status search was to rely on a national economy with a national bourgeoisie under state support.<sup>46</sup> A national bourgeoisie also provides a guarantee for foreign capital to work together in line with the practice set in the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>47</sup> In this manner, the Turkish commercial bourgeoisie has volunteered to the intermediation with foreign capital<sup>48</sup> and since the problem of capitulations could not be completely solved in Lausanne, the share of foreign capital has been double of the national one in industrial investments in 1923-29.<sup>49</sup> Thus has the Turkish republican journey within global capitalism and its then companion the Wilsonian world order begun.

The historical change has been introduced by the most notorious of the capitalist crises in 1929. The "collapse of the values and institutions of the liberal civilization" such as constitutional government and representative assemblies was experienced dramatically.<sup>50</sup> As a result, nationalism dominated the 1930s. Nationalism and internationalism had already been in conflict in economic relations: The effects of wartime collectivism, the needs of postwar recovery, the demand for national protection of industries caused national economic policies at the expense of international trade.<sup>51</sup> Relations of production had a mark on the states and international politics, observable in yet again perilously increasing nationalism.

The introvert power politics of 1930s provided the opportunity to decrease Turkish economic dependence. TFP has consistently emphasised peaceful relations even in the turbulent 1930s, summarised in the everlasting motto of "Peace at home, peace abroad" by Atatürk; to concentrate on domestic reforms rather than challenging territorial settlement. In this manner, 1930s has been an opportunity for national industry and for example, some

43 Taner Timur, *Türk Devrimi ve Sonrası*, Ankara, İmge, 1971, 1997, p.14.

44 Gönübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1990*, p.60.

45 Oran, "İmparatorluk'tan Ulus-devlet'e...", p. 47-49.

46 Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908-2002*, p. 26-27.

47 Timur, *Türk Devrimi ve Sonrası*, p. 42.

48 Ibid., p.64.

49 Keyder, *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, p.121.

50 Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes*, p. 110-111.

51 Thomson, *Europe Since Napoleon*, p. 680.



foreign investments could be nationalised.<sup>52</sup> Indeed, the share of industry in the economy jumped from (pre-1929) 10,5% to 16,6% in 1935.<sup>53</sup> However, Turkish exports were pretty mono-dimensional and the share of Germany increased up to 40%.<sup>54</sup> This had repercussions for TFP in its balance of power quest in the interwar years.

All in all, Türkiye has repeatedly declared accord to the world order, no matter what the liberal disposition of 1920s or nationalist power politics of 1930s. The relations of production marked the change in the interwar years from a liberal mood to the destructive interstate rivalry. Global change in the production, the world order and the form of state after 1929 has not damaged the continuity of TFP as a peaceful status quo state; yet, nationalism has affected the Turkish state on the grounds of long searched economic independence.

## The Cold War: Restructuring of TFP and Political Economy

Türkiye could reach WWII and aftermath as a sovereign state, also in the political economic sense. The Cold War between US as the leader of capitalism and the liberal order and the Soviet Union as the leader of a socialist attempt has become the main international framework. This conflict had manifested a clearest example of relations of production: these two had opposite designs for production. This has been the new world in which TFP became subject to serious restructuring.

Communists emerged as a powerful political force in many countries from France to China, which was the salient concern for the US led capitalist world. The American motivation was to prevent another global economic crisis and the increase of this communist influence.<sup>55</sup> The result was the containment policy; a policy which reflected “old school diplomatic power politics”.<sup>56</sup> TFP has deliberately and clearly chosen the American approach so it would be thus defined by the American policy of containment of Soviet communism. The result has been the development of a Turkish version of the Cold War security state. This security state has been coupled with the nationalist-welfare state that has been the consequence of the salient changes in the capitalist world following 1929 crisis under Keynesianism.

Within American centred capitalist production with exports and investments; the former interstate hierarchy was “overturned”, colonial domination was “under challenge” and capitalism was “confronting a hostile social system”.<sup>57</sup> American centred capitalist production has signified the internationalisation and later globalisation of the world economy and countries were redesigned according to the global relations of production.<sup>58</sup> The Turkish connection to

52 Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908-2002*, p. 64, 69.

53 T. Bulutay, Y. Tezel, N. Yıldırım, *Türkiye Milli Geliri (1923-1948)*, Ankara, 1974, quoted in Keyder, *Türkiye’de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, p. 131.

54 Kazgan, *Tanzimat’tan 21. Yüzyıla Türkiye Ekonomisi*, p. 63, 65.

55 Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes*, p.231.

56 Ibid., p. 231-33.

57 Philip Armstrong, Andrew Glyn and John Harrison, *Capitalism Since World War II: the Making and Breakup of the Great Boom*, London, Fontana, 1984, p. 50-53, 21-24.

58 Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, *The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire*, London, Verso, 2012, p.105.

the global economy was as damaged as anyone else's in the 1929-45 disorder period, and restored under American hegemony after 1945.<sup>59</sup> Within this restoration, Turkish political economy has again manifested the characteristics of countries dependent on the developed countries.<sup>60</sup> The "imposition" of American advisors "to guide" the political economies of countries aspiring to American aid has been enlarged to Türkiye. American policy has been designed according to the desire "to provide an environment to attract private investment".<sup>61</sup> As a matter of fact, the discussions of (in)dependence in TFP during Cold War can be also conceived within this political economic framework.

In these new frameworks of political economy and foreign policy, Türkiye has become a NATO member in 1952, where its main strength was essentially the insecurity that its loss would pose.<sup>62</sup> Truman's policy of aid to Greece and Türkiye was welcomed and praised by Turkish president İsmet İnönü, indeed on the grounds of world peace.<sup>63</sup> Moreover, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed his satisfaction to be included in the European political and economic space in 1949.<sup>64</sup> The Turkish state was being redefined along the American centred world order. The Turkish contribution to NATO and thus main assets of TFP were its manpower and geographical proximity to the Soviet Union ("real estate value") that provided impeccable opportunity for air bases.<sup>65</sup> There was no significant difference in Türkiye's position in world production and security: lower cost of labour and geography.

In this manner, Türkiye has been repositioned in the international political economic division of labour led by US: redefinition of the role of the state in the economy with a prominence to agriculture (instead of industrialisation of 1930s) and incentives to foreign capital (instead of nationalisation).<sup>66</sup> Therefore, a new emphasis on outward orientation gained ground.<sup>67</sup> The imports that did not previously have a weight in Turkish political economy seriously increased and mostly financed by the US.<sup>68</sup> The Americanisation of TFP and of Turkish political economy has been consonant.

This consonance of TFP and political economy was displayed in the Korean War. The Korean War caused a commodities boom, such as wool, cotton etc. to the extent that the imports of raw materials in Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) increased 20 percent. As such the Korean War and rearmament provided an impetus for economic growth.<sup>69</sup> Within this framework, Turkish exports of raw materials and agricultural primary products increased, thus their place was enlarged in Turkish production from 42 per cent to 45 per cent,

59 Kazgan, *Tanzimat'tan 21. Yüzyıla Türkiye Ekonomisi*, p.77.

60 Cole, *Introduction to Economic History*, p. 184.

61 Panitch and Gindin, *The Making of Global Capitalism*, p. 51, 105.

62 Serhat Güvenç, "NATO'nun Evrimi ve Türkiye'nin Transatlantik Güvenliği Katkıları", *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Vol. 12, No 45, 2015, p. 104.

63 Gönübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1990*, p. 216.

64 Oran, "İmparatorluk'tan Ulus-devlet'e Dış Politika ...", p. 497.

65 Güvenç, "NATO'nun Evrimi ve Türkiye'nin ...", p. 101, 103.

66 Kazgan, *Tanzimat'tan 21. Yüzyıla Türkiye Ekonomisi*, p. 82.

67 Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908-2002*, p. 94.

68 Keyder, *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, p. 149.

69 Armstrong, Glyn and Harrison, *Capitalism Since World War II*, p. 159-160.

with an average yearly growth of 13.2 percent (compared to 9.2 per cent of the industry).<sup>70</sup> As late as 1968-71, the agricultural primary goods were as high as 77 per cent of Turkish exports.<sup>71</sup> A return to efforts of industrialisation would wait deterioration in Turkish-NATO relations and Détente.

This deterioration was due to the Cyprus problem and consequent reactions to US and NATO in Turkish public and elite opinion. This had resulted in the search of a multidimensional foreign policy which marked TFP after mid-1960s.<sup>72</sup> For instance, the Turkish relative reluctance in NATO Multilateral force has been remarkable.<sup>73</sup> Türkiye benefited from the détente period by increasing its economic relations with the Soviet Union.<sup>74</sup> Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs argued in 1964 that the positive developments in Turkish-Soviet relations were “convenient to the objectives of a national policy”.<sup>75</sup> Türkiye increasingly accepted Soviet economic and technological help. This reached the 1967 economic agreement, some high level visits were mutually paid to the extent of the inauguration of a steel factory by Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin.<sup>76</sup> Heavy industry such as steel and metallurgy was an important area of cooperation.<sup>77</sup> Turkish industrialisation helped by the Soviets in 1970s to the extent that Türkiye became the most helped developing country by the Soviet Union in 1978.<sup>78</sup> This is reminiscent of the Turkish objective and policy of industrialisation in the 1930s. The partial alienation from the US contributed to the changes in the political economy. Turkish rapprochement with the Soviet Union that had clear political economic ramifications showed an observable interplay of foreign policy with political economy. Notwithstanding the importance of causality discussions, this article rather aims to show this interplay in a Critical Theoretical frame.

The coupling political economic framework during most of the Cold War period was import substitution. The early Turkish enthusiasm to join the international division of labour in the early Cold War years was overshadowed by the crisis in 1956-58 and forms of introvert behaviour.<sup>79</sup> This accentuated an import substitution industrialisation (ISI) strategy, particularly in between two military coups in 1960 and 1980. Keynesianism has been important in the import substitution period (1960-1980) on the elements of state control of the economy, restating the importance of bureaucracy, redistribution through the reproduction of the domestic market; which also supported the protection of the national industry. Yet this has not necessarily meant a decrease in the international integration of the national economy because the national market is not entirely closed to the foreign investment and ISI industrialists still

70 Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908-2002*, p. 101.

71 Keyder, *Türkiye’de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, p. 210.

72 Gönübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1990*, p. 608.

73 Gerger, *Türk Dış Politikasının Ekonomi Politikası*, p. 122.

74 Güvenç, “NATO’nun Evrimi ve Türkiye’nin...”, p. 110.

75 Gönübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1990*, p. 524-525.

76 Erel Tellal, “SSCB’yle İlişkiler”, Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olaylar, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, Cilt I: 1919-1980, 2002, p. 779.

77 Gönübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1990*, p. 526.

78 Tellal, “SSCB’yle İlişkiler”, p. 783.

79 Kazgan, *Tanzimat’tan 21. Yüzyıla Türkiye Ekonomisi*, p. 91.

needed high technology for production. Indeed, ISI has not been considered as an opposition to the international capitalist production<sup>80</sup>. Thereby, the ISI in 1960-1980 was in cooperation with foreign capital, unlike the endeavour in 1930s.<sup>81</sup>

Moreover, Keynesianism in the international sphere as well as being a favoured country within Cold War conditions helped Türkiye to reach cheap credits to fill the acute deficits.<sup>82</sup> Türkiye's geostrategic importance in Cold War was the main reason for this favour and this amount was very influential in decreasing deficits, even when military aid is omitted.<sup>83</sup> In this manner, one can discuss whether Turkish ISI implementation has signified a serious change in foreign policy orientation. For instance, it can be argued that it has been complementary to Turkish rapprochement with the Soviet Union in the political economic sense because the need of diversification of foreign aid was important in this rapprochement and it has been pretty beneficial for Türkiye both in economic and political sense.<sup>84</sup> One may assume that increasing role of the state in the national political economy implied a stronger, rather autonomous, standpoint also in foreign policy.

In this manner, the planning under ISI has also aimed at decreasing the foreign aid, which could have repercussions for a more independent foreign policy because earlier American aid has made TFP rather dependent.<sup>85</sup> 1960s and 70s have been indeed periods of Turkish efforts to get closer to Europe rather than US and increasing (economic) relations with the Soviet Union. The weight of the European Economic Community has increased following the ratification of the Ankara Agreement in December 1964 and provided a balance to American influence.<sup>86</sup> All in all, an elaborate evaluation of the relation of the ISI and foreign policy is beyond the scope of this article and can be subject to a further research.

Late Cold War period was also Turkish transformation from the ISI to neo-liberalism and its dramatic repercussions in TFP has to be seen mostly in the post-Cold War era. The Neo-liberal period was introduced in the world following the 1973 global economic crisis. In the Turkish case, 24 January 1980 decisions to neo-liberalise Turkish economy fell short of expectations, so it would be fulfilled following the military coup in 1980.<sup>87</sup> Türkiye has been narrated as a success story both in 1980s and 2000s within the neo-liberal framework and this had ramifications in its foreign policy, as it will be analysed in the following section.

All in all, TFP had been (re)defined in the Cold War by the American-Soviet competition on the production and world order. The result has been the development/reformation of the Turkish security state coupling with the nationalist welfare regimes of post war political

80 Keyder, *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, p. 185-187, 202.

81 Haldun Gülalp, *Kapitalizm Sınıflar ve Devlet*, İstanbul, Belge Yayınları, 1993, p. 36.

82 Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908-2002*, p. 123.

83 Baskın Oran, "Dönemin Bilançosu 1960-1980 Görelî Özerklik-3", Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt 1*, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2002, p. 664.

84 Oran, "Dönemin Bilançosu 1960-1980 Görelî Özerklik-3", p. 679.

85 Gönülöbol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1990*, p. 500-501.

86 Oran, "Dönemin Bilançosu 1960-1980 Görelî Özerklik-3", p. 663.

87 Kazgan, *Tanzimat'tan 21. Yüzyıla Türkiye Ekonomisi*, p. 120.

economic order.<sup>88</sup> In the political economic framework, Türkiye has rather been a state reactive to international dominant discourses.<sup>89</sup> In this sense, it has been in an oscillation between an introvert and controlled economy and integration to the international market economy. This has also been the result of being in the Western camp of the Cold War since this allegiance included political economic conditions and benefits as well as political-military ones.<sup>90</sup> Major manifestation of this oscillation had been observed in Turkish-Soviet relations within and despite the Cold War conditions. In sum, the major change has been clear and direct participation to a camp in a conflict, as opposed to the preceding neutrality, and a form of re-peripheralisation as a result of abandoning the industrialisation of 1930s. A major continuity has been the occasional search of economic independence through industrialisation (such as import substitution industrialisation strategy) and of multidimensional (independent) foreign policy, still within liberal and capitalist order. These quests are to be redefined in the post-Cold War era.

## Turkish Political Economy in the Neo-liberal Globalisation and Foreign Policy in the post-Cold War Era

With the end of the Cold War, the world's sole remaining superpower, the US declared a new world order. Accordingly, the liberal discourse was gloriously back to world politics: peaceful settlement of disputes, solidarity against aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals, and just treatment of peoples.<sup>91</sup> The dismemberment of the Soviet Union opened a vast land to be integrated to neo-liberal capitalist globalisation. This opened new spaces for Turkish political economy and foreign policy; Türkiye would benefit from the neo-liberal American project of integrating post-communist countries to this world order. This new role of subhegemon brought new horizons to TFP<sup>92</sup> and initiated an infinite discourse on activism in foreign policy.

In contrast to this initial liberal optimist mood, uncertainty prevailed. The fate of the world order remained unclear. It was not even clear whether the states would be able to survive.<sup>93</sup> Indeed, the superpower Soviet Union as well as smaller but significant states such as Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia disappeared. In the anticipation by the astute E.H. Carr in 1945, “the movement which dismembered Austria-Hungary and created Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia was bound to be succeeded by movements for the dismemberment of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.”<sup>94</sup> In this environment, Turkish state's survival concern, controversially embodied in the territorial integrity, was emphasised.

88 Inan Rüma, “Üretim, Dünya Düzeni ve Türkiye”, B. Özkan, T. Gürakar (eds.), *Türkiye'nin Soğuk Savaş Düzeni, Ordu, Sermaye, ABD, İslamizasyon*, Tekin Yayınevi, 2020, p. 254.

89 Ziya Öniş and Fikret Şenses, “Global Dynamics, Domestic Coalitions and a Reactive State: Major Policy Shifts in Post-war Turkish Economic Development”, *METU Studies in Development*, No 34, 2007, p. 251-286.

90 Kazgan, *Tanzimat'tan 21. Yüzyıla Türkiye Ekonomisi*, p. 95, 98.

91 George Bush, “The Possibility of a New World Order”, *Vital Speeches Of the Day* 15, (5/15/91), p. 451-452.

92 Baskın Oran “Küreselleşme Ekseninde Türkiye 1990-2000, Dönemin Bilançosu”, Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olaylar, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt II: 1980-2001*, Ankara, İletişim, 2001, p. 231,233, 237.

93 Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes*, p. 559.

94 Carr, *Nationalism and After*, London, MacMillan, 1945, p. 24.

The replacement of the colossal Soviet threat with a number of smaller threats (perceptions) have actually increased concerns on territorial integrity, dramatically fuelled by Kurdish separatism by the violent PKK.<sup>95</sup> In the words of the PM and later President Demirel trying to compromise fashionable liberal discourse with Turkish concerns on security:

“In the wake of the Cold War, Turkey found herself at the very centre of a most turbulent region where ultra-nationalist, hegemonic, aggressive and irredentist tendencies had caused a number of regional wars in the past. Our policy in this regard has been to help reduce tensions and contain conflicts, and to promote democracy and the rule of law with a view to creating a peaceful and a stable environment around us.”<sup>96</sup>

The emphasis on security, mostly as a result of the intense fighting with the separatist PKK in 1984-95 overshadowed democratisation, while it would be expected in a Cold War security state as a result of the liberal mood in the early post-Cold War years. Being less than a full democracy created tensions in TFP, despite the continuous official discourse as exemplified above.<sup>97</sup> However, the neo-liberal globalisation has also been imposed in the political economic sense.

Türkiye had to readjust itself to the requirements of the neo-liberal globalisation also because it had followed a foreign policy that was mostly in line with the US.<sup>98</sup> US has been “a state dedicated to the transformation of the world in a certain manner”<sup>99</sup> and the new term of this transformation has been the neo-liberal globalisation. Türkiye had already become one of the show cases of neo-liberalism with the major economic policy change already officially declared in 1980 and was thereby already praised in 1980s.<sup>100</sup> This has had ramifications in TFP as well. Within the export-led economic growth mentality of the neo-liberal globalisation, Türkiye needed markets for increasing its exports and new Turkish elite perceived its neighbouring regions as a natural outlet. In this sense, a new commitment to regionalism in TFP and this chosen path to the integration to the neo-liberal globalisation can be considered “complementary rather than contradictory”.<sup>101</sup>

Moreover, conflicts in these neighbouring regions restated Türkiye’s “real estate value” in NATO. It has become a country contributing to international peacekeeping and was eager to send its troops abroad.<sup>102</sup> In this manner, Türkiye that was an outpost of NATO during Cold War has found itself in the centre of post-Cold War problems. As a result, Türkiye’s new

95 Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 236.

96 Süleyman Demirel, “Turkey and NATO at the Threshold of a New Century”, *Perceptions A Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 4, No 1, 1999.

97 Mustafa Aydın, “Turkish Foreign Policy at the End of the Cold War: Roots and Dynamics”, *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, Vol. 36, 2005, p. 11.

98 Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 239-240.

99 Eric Hobsbawm, *The New Century*, London, Abacus, 2000, p. 48.

100 Kazgan, *Tanzimat’tan 21. Yüzyıla Türkiye Ekonomisi*, p. 141.

101 Nilgün Önder, “The Turkish Political Economy: Globalization and Regionalism”, *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology*, Vol. 6, 2007, p. 229-230.

102 Güvenç, “NATO’nun Evrimi ve Türkiye’nin ...”, p. 111.

commitments to regionalism such as Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) or European Union (EU) have been observed.<sup>103</sup> Within neo-liberal globalisation, Türkiye's NATO membership has also had a political economic value such as -much needed- credits<sup>104</sup> and foreign direct investments that were considered a major fuel for its capital deficit economic growth.<sup>105</sup> The Turkish political economy in American centred neo-liberal globalisation and TFP in accordance with the American objective to integrate post-communist countries to the post-Cold War world order have been consonant. This article attempts to expose this consonance as the interplay of political economy and foreign policy within the framework of Critical Theory without necessarily claiming a causality though it certainly is an important discussion.

In this context, the neo-liberal transformation of the Turkish Cold War security state has become the major issue, with remarkable repercussions in TFP. A liberal mood focusing on the international integration rather than nationalism in foreign policy urged a greater emphasis on Turkish–EU relations.<sup>106</sup> The Turkish business world has supported integration with the EU on the grounds of foreign investment and technology.<sup>107</sup> In this manner, considering that “economic development greatly contributes to the internal demands from governments to formulate external policies that reflect and serve the diversity of interests”<sup>108</sup>; TFP has been -again- interwoven with political economy beginning with the neo-liberal 1980s. Consequently, the foreign policy became increasingly concerned with “obtaining necessary foreign loans, opening up necessary markets for Turkish goods, and striking necessary deals with foreign governments and sometimes even with companies in order to bring more investments into the country”.<sup>109</sup> In this liberal mood, some traditional parameters of TFP, for instance the importance given to peaceful relations-have been reiterated.<sup>110</sup>

Turkish application for full membership in 1987 and the launch of the Customs Union in 1996 (based on Ankara Agreement in 1963) being the cornerstones, Turkish advance in the path of the European Union has equally signified its integration to the neo-liberal world order. Considering that the export oriented economic growth has been a major principle in neo-liberal globalisation and that the major and irreplaceable market for Turkish exports has been Europe, Turkish political economic path has unavoidably led to the EU, and thus TFP. It has been partially and occasionally desecuritized within this framework of European integration.<sup>111</sup> The

103 Aydın, “Turkish Foreign Policy at the End of the Cold War”, p. 2, 4.

104 Kazgan, *Tanzimat'tan 21. Yüzyıla Türkiye Ekonomisi*, p. 127.

105 A. Erinç Yeldan and Burcu Ünüvar, “An Assessment of the Turkish Economy in the AKP Era”, *Research and Policy on Turkey*, Vol. 1, No 1, 2016, p. 11.

106 Yalvaç, “Approaches to Turkish Foreign Policy”, p. 122.

107 Atıla Eralp, “Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönemde Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliği”, Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı, *Türkiye'nin Yeni Dünyası*, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Alfa, 2002, p. 243.

108 J.N. Rosenau, “Study of Foreign Policy”, J. N. Rosenau, K. W. Thompson and G. Boyds (eds.), *World Politics: An Introduction*, New York, 1971, p. 20, quoted in Aydın, “Turkish Foreign Policy at the end of the Cold War”, p.18.

109 Aydın, “Turkish Foreign Policy at the end of the Cold War”, p. 21-22.

110 Oral Sander, *Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, Ankara, İmge, 1998, p.145-147.

111 Sinem Akgül-Açıkmeşe, “EU Conditionality and Desecuritization Nexus in Turkey”, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol.13, No 3, 2013, p. 303.

role of the army has been redefined and hence lessened.<sup>112</sup> In this regard, a number of issues in this transformation have been scrutinised.<sup>113</sup>

It was thus argued that Türkiye as a “post-Cold War warrior” of the mid-1990s was transforming to a “trading state” in 2000s in a process that indeed started in 1980.<sup>114</sup> This transformation has been considered as a reason of a new activism in TFP and its success, as also exemplified in the so called “the zero-problem policy with the neighbors” by then Minister of Foreign Affairs (later PM) Ahmet Davutoğlu.<sup>115</sup> The political economic relations in the form of business and exports has been gloriously underlined with a direct reference to Davutoğlu himself.<sup>116</sup>

In the same manner, the term “neoliberal competition state” was also employed as opposed to security-oriented foreign policies that were indeed getting replaced with elements of economic interdependence and global integration.<sup>117</sup> Therefore, TFP “has increasingly been shaped by economic considerations — such as export markets, investment opportunities, tourism, energy supplies and the like.”<sup>118</sup> This new shape could be observed in the increasing role of the non-governmental actors, particularly in the political economic sense and in accordance with neo-liberal globalisation, such as the role of the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) in changing of the Cyprus policy in 2004, the role of the Diyarbakır Chamber of Commerce and other businesspersons operating in Iraqi Kurdish Region, the Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council in President Abdullah Gül’s visit to Armenia; the role of Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Türkiye (TOBB) in Turkish-Israeli-Palestinian relations and tourism in relations with Russia.<sup>119</sup> The emphasis on regionalism in TFP that started in the immediate post-Cold War era has also been accentuated in 2000s with the “zero problem policy” in the officially declared objective of being a “regional power.” In this sense, “To form a system of political, economic and socio-cultural alliances with all regional actors concerning mutual interests and region-wide stability”<sup>120</sup> has become an explicit objective; consonant with neo-liberal globalisation.

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112 Gencer Özcan, “The Changing Role of Turkey’s Military in Foreign Policy Making”, *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, No 23, 2010, p. 23.

113 For some examples: Özlem Terzi, *The Influence of the European Union on Turkish Foreign Policy*, Farnham, Ashgate, 2010; Bahar Rumelili, “Transforming Conflicts on EU Borders: The Case of Greek-Turkish Relations”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 45, No 1, 2007, p. 105–126; Meltem Müftüler-Baç and Yaprak Gürsoy, “Is There a Europeanization of Turkish Foreign Policy? An Addendum to the Literature on EU Candidates”, *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 11, No 3, 2010, p. 406-427.

114 Kirişçi, “The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy...”, p. 33.

115 Ibid., p.53-54

116 Ibid., p.42. The reference to Davutoğlu is: Interview with Ahmet Davutoğlu “İş Dünyası artık Dış Politikannın Öncülerinden”, *Turkishtime*, 2004.

117 Sadık Ünay, “Economic Diplomacy for Competitiveness: Globalization and Turkey’s New Foreign Policy”, *Perceptions*, Vol. 15, No 3-4, 2010, p. 26-27.

118 Kirişçi, “The transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy...”, p. 39.

119 Ibid., p.50.

120 Ünay, “Economic Diplomacy for Competitiveness...”, p. 31.



Moreover, it was observed that foreign trade had increased to 45 per cent of Turkish GDP in 2008 while it constituted only a meagre 13 per cent in 1975.<sup>121</sup> As a result, businesspersons involved in foreign trade has pressured the government for enlarging these possibilities in foreign policy, such as greater trade with Iran despite the economic sanctions.<sup>122</sup> The state has been transformed accordingly: The relative weight of the army and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in TFP was increasingly shared with the ministries of Energy, Trade, Transportation and business interest groups.<sup>123</sup> In brief, neo-liberal globalisation has signified a transformation of the TFP in the sense of questioning the understanding of sovereignty, conceiving foreign policy beyond the defence of territorial integrity, and reformation of state administration including the Army and Ministry of Foreign Affairs with new roles and functions.<sup>124</sup>

The arguments on the liberal transformation of the state assumed a clear dichotomy between the army based traditional nation-state elite and the business world and their partner AKP government. However, this neo-liberal transformation started during the authoritarian military regime in 1980-83 and under the strict military control of society.<sup>125</sup> In this sense, “The most nationalist and ‘statist’ institution of the state thus became the executor of an economic program that aimed to open up the national economy to global market forces”.<sup>126</sup>

In brief, the production changed to a neo-liberal globalisation, the corresponding world order was crowned with the end of Cold War, and thus the Turkish state and its foreign policy has changed. In the words of a liberal advocate, Turkish economy’s integration into the (neo-liberal) global economy has been compelling Türkiye to become a trading state.<sup>127</sup> A causality discussion seems plausible at this point, but the aim of this article is to discuss this interplay in the framework of Critical Theory.

Then came the global economic crisis in 2008 with the great challenge it posed to neo-liberal globalisation. The relations of production have been redefined with increasing economic nationalism, typically represented by the Trump presidency among minor others; multipolarity has become the new fashionable term regarding the world order; and changes in foreign policies including the Turkish one has become a major issue. A repercussion in TFP has been that notorious “shift of axis” discussion.

Türkiye has begun to diverge from liberal economies because of “pre-existing policy and macroeconomic constraints, cognitive lapses on the part of policymakers, and the

121 Kemal Kirişçi and Neslihan Kaptanoğlu, “The Politics of Trade and Turkish Foreign Policy”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 47, No 5, 2011, p. 705.

122 “Turkish Tigers press Iran Trade amidst Fears of Sanctions”, *Daily Star*, 28 June 2010, quoted in Kirişçi and Kaptanoğlu, “The Politics of Trade”, p. 717.

123 Kirişçi and Kaptanoğlu, “The Politics of Trade”, p. 713. Also quoted: K. Kirisci, ‘Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Turbulent Times’, *Chaillot Paper*, No 92, Paris, Institute for Security Studies, 2006.

124 Gencer Özcan, “İki Binli Yıllarda Türkiye’de Dış Politika Yapım Süreci”, Faruk Sönmezoglu, Nurcan Özgür Baklacıoğlu and Özlem Terzi (eds.), *XXI.Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, İstanbul, Der Yayınları, 2012.

125 Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908-2002*, p. 147.

126 Önder, “The Turkish Political Economy: ...”, p. 235.

127 Kirişçi, “The transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy...”, p. 48.

conjunctural dynamics of domestic politics”.<sup>128</sup> This tendency has eventually resulted in state capitalism and authoritarianism, instead of liberal economy and democratisation.<sup>129</sup> Therefore, the emphasis on EU integration lessened in TFP, which has increasingly been defined as one of an assertive regional power. It has been expressed through transfiguring “Turkey from an ordinary, medium-sized actor to a sub-regional imperial power”.<sup>130</sup> This assertiveness exposed a “self-confident and defiant strategic orientation” discursively and arguably reluctant on EU and NATO.<sup>131</sup> This overconfidence signified a self-appointment to be involved in the future of the neighbouring countries.<sup>132</sup> Therefore, it has also signified (re-)securitization of TFP.<sup>133</sup> The Middle East has been the theatre of this overconfident foreign policy and “Turkey’s new Middle East policy is characterised by heightened threat perceptions, zero sum competition with other regional powers, the increasing resort to the use of military force, risky behaviours and brinkmanship, and a preference for unilateral action.”<sup>134</sup>

In sum, in the post-Cold War era the change has been Turkish integration to the neo-liberal globalisation and the transformation of Turkish Cold War security state to a neo-liberal “trading state”. The following change with the 2008 global economic crisis accentuated Turkish oscillation between these two, often blended with the pressing need of economic growth. The major continuity of search for economic independence and for multidimensional (independent) foreign policy has been resumed with a religious conservative nationalist approach in 2010s.

## Conclusion

This article aims at underlining political economy in the analysis of TFP. In this regard, its main question is how TFP has been affected by the historical changes of relations of production and world order within the framework of the Critical Theory as explained by Robert Cox. Its main argument is that the continuity and change in TFP has exposed an interplay of relations of production and world order.

Republic of Türkiye has been one of the consequences of Wilsonian liberalism that aimed to form -supposedly- democratic nation-states. Türkiye’s utmost priority in the Interwar Period was to keep an equal status in the post-war settlement, also in the political economic sense, as shown in Turkish determination on abolishing foreign economic privileges during and after the Lausanne Conference. The change in the production, the world order and the form of state after 1929 has not damaged the continuity of TFP as a peaceful status quo state;

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128 Ziya Öniş and Ali Burak Güven, “Global Crisis, National Responses: The Political Economy of Turkish Exceptionalism”, *New Political Economy*, Vol. 16, No 5, 2011, p. 585-608.

129 Ziya Öniş, “Turkey under the Challenge of State Capitalism: the Political Economy of the Late AKP Era”, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 19, No 2, 2019, p. 201-225.

130 Türkes, “Decomposing Neo-Ottoman Hegemony”, p. 211.

131 Ömer Taşpınar, “The Rise of Turkish Gaullism: Getting Turkish-American Relations Right”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 13, No 1, 2011, p.11-17.

132 Lerna K. Yanık, “Bringing the Empire Back In: The Gradual Discovery of the Ottoman Empire in Turkish Foreign Policy”, *Die Welt des Islams*, Vol. 56, 2016, p. 466-488.

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yet, the nationalism of the Great Depression has encouraged the Turkish state for the long desired economic sovereignty.

The Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union as a historical change of world order signified a competition and conflict as a clear example of relations of production. TFP has displayed a visible repercussion: It was defined by the American Containment Policy in dealing with the Soviet Union as a perceived expansionist state and communism as a rival world order. Regarding the political economic aspect, Türkiye has been relocated in the international division of labour led by US. Türkiye's importance in the world production and security (NATO) have been similar: lower labour cost and geography. The result has been the Turkish Cold War security state, also as a nationalist-welfare state occasionally coupling with the ISI, in line with the post-war political economic order.

The post-Cold War era introduced the transformation of security states in the neo-liberal globalisation. TFP has sailed in the ambivalence between security concerns as a result of conflicts in its neighbouring regions and the very threat of separatism posed by the PKK, and the increasing reference to the principles of a liberal world order such as democracy, peace, integration, cooperation, economic and cultural relations. 2000s were marked by rather liberal tendencies both as a result of domestic political and international political economic conditions. The religious conservative JDP governments needed economic growth for consolidating its power so new for markets increased Turkish exports, and hence it had a discourse on peace and cooperation. 2008 global economic crisis signified a worldwide return to nationalism, and thus Turkish political economy has become less neo-liberal and foreign policy has been re-securitized, particularly in the Middle East that JDP prioritised.

In the final analysis, no matter “a matter of wealth and poverty, life and death”<sup>135</sup> or “struggle over wealth, power and knowledge”<sup>136</sup>, TFP is not any different than any other activity in the struggle for wealth, power and knowledge in the world, for life and welfare of -presumably- the citizens of the Republic of Türkiye, or more narrowly the ruling elite of this country.<sup>137</sup> Thus has been the historical change and continuity in TFP.

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